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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Ninth 
Circuit Rule 28(b), Defendant-Appellee Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) states as follows: 
Twitter is a publicly held corporation and does not have a parent corporation.  No 
publicly traded corporation owns ten percent or more of its stock. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs are surviving family members of Lloyd Fields, Jr., and James 
Damon Creach—two U.S. citizens killed in a terrorist attack in Jordan by former 
Jordanian police captain Anwar Abu Zaid.  Rather than sue any of the individuals 
or groups that may have authorized, planned, or committed that heinous crime, 
Plaintiffs have instead sued Twitter, Inc., a provider of free online services used by 
hundreds of millions of people around the world.  Plaintiffs do not allege that Abu 
Zaid ever used Twitter’s services.  Nor do they allege that Twitter’s services were 
used in any way in connection with Abu Zaid’s attack.  Instead, Plaintiffs attempt 
to hold Twitter liable on the theory that Twitter’s ubiquitous online platform was 
allegedly used by others—members and sympathizers of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (“ISIS”)—to transmit messages promoting their views and agenda.  
According to Plaintiffs, Twitter’s alleged failure to prevent those individuals from 
using its services renders it liable for the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach 
under the civil remedy provision of the federal Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 
U.S.C. § 2333(a).   
Twitter deeply sympathizes with Plaintiffs for their losses and is committed 
to combatting the spread of terrorist content online.  But Twitter is not liable for 
Abu Zaid’s appalling attack.  As the district court correctly concluded, Plaintiffs’ 
claims fail as a matter of law for two fundamental reasons.   
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First, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230 because they attempt 
to hold Twitter liable for allegedly failing to prevent third parties from posting 
content that allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.  This Court repeatedly has held 
that Section 230 immunizes online service providers from liability for performing 
or not performing “traditional editorial functions” relating to third-party content, 
such as disseminating or failing to block or remove objectionable content created 
by their users.  E.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Kimzey v. 
Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016).  Here, Plaintiffs seek to do exactly 
that—hold Twitter liable on the theory that Twitter failed to prevent members and 
supporters of ISIS from opening Twitter accounts that transmitted content that 
somehow may have indirectly caused Abu Zaid’s attack.  Accepting such a theory 
would impose liability on Twitter for publishing other people’s information—
precisely the result Section 230 forbids.   
Second, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that plausibly establish injury “by 
reason of”—or proximately caused by—an act of international terrorism 
committed by Twitter, as the ATA’s civil remedy provision requires.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(a); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 123-
125 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Al Rajhi”).  Countless intervening acts and actors separate 
Twitter’s supposedly unlawful conduct—allegedly failing to block members and 
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sympathizers of ISIS from using Twitter’s platform—from Abu Zaid’s heinous 
crimes.  Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that Twitter’s conduct “led directly” to 
their injuries—which is the proximate cause standard that the Supreme Court has 
applied whenever a federal statute includes the “by reason of” language found in 
the ATA.  Nor can Plaintiffs satisfy the more relaxed standard they erroneously 
propose—which would require them to allege facts plausibly demonstrating that 
Twitter’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing injuries that were 
“reasonably foreseeable.”  The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs’ claims 
fail to satisfy either standard of causation, thus providing an independent ground 
for dismissal.    
JURISDICTION 
Twitter agrees with Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statement (Br. 3). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court correctly held that the immunity for online 
intermediaries created by Section 230 bars imposing liability on Twitter for its 
alleged failure to prevent members or sympathizers of a terrorist group from using 
its globally available online platform and direct messaging services to transmit 
third-party content. 
2. Whether the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim for relief under the civil remedy provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act because 
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they did not plead facts plausibly establishing that Twitter proximately caused 
Plaintiffs’ injuries. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
An addendum to this brief sets forth all pertinent statutory provisions. 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are the widows of Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr. and James Damon 
Creach and two surviving children of Mr. Creach.  AER28 ¶¶ 2-5.  On November 
9, 2015, Anwar Abu Zaid shot and killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach in an attack 
on the International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan, where Mr. Fields 
and Mr. Creach were working as government contractors.  AER9.  Abu Zaid was a 
Jordanian police captain who had been studying at the Center.  Id.   
Twitter, the Defendant, operates a global Internet platform for public self-
expression and conversation used by hundreds of millions of people that is free of 
charge and almost universally available.  AER32 ¶ 35.  Users with a Twitter 
account can send “Tweets”—messages of 140 characters or less, sometimes with 
picture or video—to anyone who has chosen to “follow” that user, and those 
Tweets typically may also be viewed by anyone with access to the Internet.  E.g. 
AER29, 35-36 ¶¶ 11, 51, 55.  Other users may, in turn, “retweet” those messages to 
their own followers.  E.g., AER35, 37-38 ¶¶ 48, 68.  Using Direct Messaging, 
users can also communicate “‘with one person or many’” by sending a message 
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only to specific user accounts, rather than making the message available to all 
Twitter users.  AER33 ¶ 43.  Users further express themselves through the user 
name, photograph, and self-description they select for their public profiles.  
AER29, 32 ¶¶ 12, 39.  Each day, Twitter’s users send and share hundreds of 
millions of Tweets and messages touching on a broad range of topics—from a 
special election to a joke told on late-night television to the announcement of a 
new job.  See AER32 ¶ 36.   
A.   The Original And First Amended Complaints 
Plaintiff Tamara Fields commenced this action on January 13, 2016.  
AER47.  After Twitter moved to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended 
Complaint, which, among other things, added Mr. Creach’s widow and children as 
plaintiffs.  AER49; SER4 ¶¶ 8-10. 
The First Amended Complaint did not allege that Twitter committed the 
shooting in Jordan in which Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach were killed.  Nor did it 
allege that Abu Zaid, the shooter, was recruited over Twitter or that he (or anyone 
else) used Twitter to plan, carry out, or raise funds for the attack.  SER22 (First 
Op.).  It did not even allege that Abu Zaid ever had an account on Twitter, ever 
viewed a Tweet, or ever used Twitter’s platform in any way.  Id. 
Plaintiffs instead attempted to tie Twitter to the shooting through a series of 
other alleged connections—first between Abu Zaid and ISIS and then between 
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members and sympathizers of ISIS and Twitter.  Attempting to link Abu Zaid to 
ISIS, the First Amended Complaint alleged that Abu Zaid’s brother told reporters 
that Abu Zaid had been inspired to commit his heinous crime by ISIS’s “brutal 
execution of Jordanian pilot Maaz al-Kassabeh in February 2015.”  SER17 ¶ 84.  
According to that complaint, ISIS allegedly had publicized that execution by, 
among other things, posting messages about it on Twitter’s platform.  Id.  The First 
Amended Complaint did not allege that Abu Zaid learned about the execution 
through Twitter’s platform, or otherwise explain how he learned of it.  See id.; see 
also SER22 (First Op.).  The First Amended Complaint further alleged that ISIS 
claimed responsibility for Abu Zaid’s attack in a statement that described him as a 
“lone wolf.”  SER16 ¶ 80. 
The First Amended Complaint separately attempted to link ISIS to Twitter.  
It alleged that the hundreds of millions of users of Twitter’s online services 
included some individuals who were affiliated with or sympathetic to ISIS.   
SER2-3 ¶¶ 1-5.  It further alleged that some of those individuals promoted ISIS’s 
activities and/or agenda by sending Tweets and Direct Messages to recruit new 
terrorists, raise funds, and spread propaganda.  SER5-10 ¶¶ 19-47.  For example, it 
alleged that sympathizers of ISIS had Tweeted “a notorious promotional training 
video, ‘Flames of War’” as an illustration of how ISIS used Twitter to recruit new 
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members, SER7 ¶ 26, and it highlighted images of alleged fundraising efforts by 
ISIS on Twitter, SER7-8 ¶¶ 32, 34.   
Plaintiffs acknowledged that Twitter has rules regarding the types of content 
permitted on its platform and that those rules “prohibit ‘threats of violence … 
including threatening or promoting terrorism.’”  SER13-14 ¶¶ 66, 70.  But they 
alleged that Twitter had not always blocked such content and instead “knowingly 
permitted the terrorist group ISIS to use its social network as a tool for spreading 
extremist propaganda, raising funds, and attracting new recruits.”  SER2 ¶ 1.  And 
they criticized Twitter for (allegedly) enforcing its rules only in response to reports 
from users.  SER13 ¶ 66.  According to Plaintiffs, that was not good enough:  
Twitter instead should have “proactively” “monitor[ed]” hundreds of millions of 
tweets, posts, videos, and other content transmitted over the Twitter platform, and 
pre-emptively “censor[ed] user content,” “shut down … ISIS-linked account[s],” 
and blocked ISIS-related accounts from “springing right back up.”  SER13 ¶¶ 66, 
69. 
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs claimed that Twitter was liable for 
treble damages for the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach under the civil remedy 
provision of the ATA.  In Count I, Plaintiffs sought to hold Twitter directly liable 
on the theory that it “purposefully, knowingly or with willful blindness” provided 
“material support” to ISIS in the form of “services and support” in violation of 18 
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U.S.C. § 2339A, and that that “material support” was “a proximate cause of the 
injury inflicted on Plaintiffs.”  SER18 ¶¶ 88-90.  Count II asserted a parallel theory 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.  SER18-19 ¶¶ 92-94.   
B.   The District Court’s Initial Ruling 
Twitter moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and the district court 
granted that motion, SER21-35, holding that Section 230 barred Plaintiffs’ claims 
and that Plaintiffs had failed to plead facts sufficient to establish proximate cause.  
With respect to Section 230, the court explained that the statute “‘immunizes 
providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content 
created by third parties’” so long as the defendant is “(a) a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service (b) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as publisher or 
speaker (c) of information provided by another information content provider.”  
SER25.  The court further explained that Plaintiffs disputed only the middle 
element—“whether they seek to treat Twitter as a publisher or speaker”—and that 
they did so based on two theories:  (1) Plaintiffs contended that “their claims are 
not based on ‘the content of tweets, the issuing of tweets, or the failure to remove 
tweets,’” but rather on Twitter’s “‘provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first 
place.’”  SER25-27 (quoting Plaintiffs’ opposition).  (2) Plaintiffs “highlight[ed] 
their allegations regarding Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities, and assert[ed] 
that ‘[b]ecause these private messages are not published …, a lawsuit based on 
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their content is not barred by [Section 230].’”  SER27 (quoting Plaintiffs’ 
opposition).  The court rejected both theories. 
As to Plaintiffs’ so-called account-provision theory, the court identified 
three fundamental defects.  First, the court found the theory did not actually “align 
with the allegations in the [First Amended Complaint],” which was “riddled with 
detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, and videos disseminated 
through Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of that 
content.”  SER27-28.   
Second, according to the court, even if Plaintiffs had pled an account-
provision theory, it “would be just as barred by section 230(c)(1)” as a theory 
directly challenging Twitter’s decisions about “what [particular] third-party 
content may be posted.”  SER29.  “Under either theory,” the court explained, “the 
alleged wrongdoing is the decision to permit third parties to post content—it is just 
that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would be liable for 
granting permission to post (through the provision of Twitter accounts) instead of 
for allowing postings that have already occurred.”  SER30.  Moreover, the court 
reasoned, finding Twitter liable for failing to block accounts “would significantly 
affect Twitter’s monitoring and publication of third-party content.”  SER32.   
Third, moving beyond Section 230, the court held that Plaintiffs’ account-
provision theory failed to satisfy the proximate cause element of their ATA claims.  
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SER32-33.  Courts in ATA cases, the court explained, had “rejected alleged causal 
connections that are too speculative or attenuated to raise a plausible inference of 
proximate causation.”  SER33 n.4.  That same defect doomed Plaintiffs’ First 
Amended Complaint, the court concluded, because the only alleged connection 
between Twitter and Abu Zaid’s attack—“that Abu Zaid’s brother told reporters 
that Abu Zaid had been very moved” by an execution that “ISIS publicized through 
Twitter”—was “tenuous at best.”  SER32.   Accordingly, the court ruled that 
“[e]ven under … [the] ‘substantial factor’ test” (Plaintiffs’ preferred but erroneous 
causation test), Plaintiffs had “not plausibly alleged the causal connection 
necessary” to support their claims.  SER32-33. 
The court also rejected the First Amended Complaint’s other “attempt to 
evade section 230(c)(1)”—the theory that Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities 
are categorically unprotected by Section 230.  SER33-34.  The court explained that 
Congress had enacted the statute in response to a state court ruling that an online 
service provider could be liable for defamation based on third-party content posted 
on its service.  In light of that history, the court reasoned, “the statute’s protections 
extend at least as far as the ‘treat[ment] [of] internet service providers as publishers 
… for the purposes of defamation.’”  SER34.  And because “the term 
‘publication’” in defamation law includes any communication “‘to one other than 
the person defamed,’” “the private nature of Direct Messaging does not remove the 
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transmission of such messages from the scope of publishing activity under section 
230(c)(1).”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Although dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims, the court granted Plaintiffs 
leave to amend again, SER35, which Plaintiffs took.  AER51.   
C.  The Second Amended Complaint 
The Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading for 
purposes of this appeal, presented a new theory for trying to connect Abu Zaid to 
ISIS.  It dropped the allegations that he had been inspired by ISIS’s execution of a 
Jordanian pilot that allegedly had been publicized via Twitter, and replaced them 
with an allegation that, according to Israeli military intelligence, he had once 
belonged to an ISIS “terror cell” when he was a university student.  AER41 ¶ 81.  
Relatedly, the Second Amended Complaint repeated the allegation that ISIS had 
claimed responsibility for Abu Zaid’s attack, although it omitted reference to 
ISIS’s alleged depiction of Abu Zaid as a “lone wolf.”  Compare SER16 (FAC), 
with AER41 ¶ 80 (SAC).  Like the First Amended Complaint, the Second 
Amended Complaint still alleged “no connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter.”  
AER9 (Second Op.). 
Beyond these modified allegations about Abu Zaid and ISIS, the Second 
Amended Complaint largely repleaded the very same allegations as its predecessor, 
but in a different order and under different headings.  It grouped allegations about 
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accounts under new headings such as “Twitter Provided Accounts To ISIS” and 
“Twitter Provided Accounts To ISIS Knowingly And Recklessly.”  AER29 (all-
caps removed).1  And Plaintiffs attempted to collect all paragraphs about content 
allegedly created by ISIS members or sympathizers under another new heading, 
“Twitter Proximately Caused Plaintiffs’ Injuries.”  See AER33-38 (all-caps 
removed).2  Plaintiffs fell short, however, in their apparent attempt to group and 
isolate all allegations regarding third-party content in this designated “proximate[] 
cause” section.  As in their prior pleadings, such allegations also appeared in the 
part of the Second Amended Complaint that purported to describe measures 
Twitter allegedly could have employed to censor ISIS content.  See AER31-33 
¶¶ 30, 32, 36-37, 40. 
D.   The District Court’s Second Ruling 
Twitter again moved to dismiss and the court again granted Twitter’s 
motion, finding that “[d]espite … careful repleading, plaintiffs’ claims [had] not 
                                           
1 Every paragraph about accounts in the Second Amended Complaint was 
copied or derived from a corresponding paragraph in the First Amended 
Complaint.  Compare AER29-38 ¶¶ 9-13, 20, 24, 29-30, 32, 38-40, 43, 48, 56, 61, 
66, 68-69, with SER1-13 ¶¶ 3-6, 20, 25, 33, 38, 43, 45, 49, 53, 59-60, 62, 68-70, 
84. 
2 For example, the Second Amended Complaint cited the same alleged use 
of Twitter by ISIS to distribute “its notorious promotional training video, ‘Flames 
of War,’” AER35 ¶ 49.  But this time, the allegation came under the new 
proximate cause section, AER33, instead of under a section titled “ISIS Relies On 
Twitter To Terrorize,” SER5 (all-caps removed).   
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changed in a meaningful way.”  AER12.  Because Plaintiffs continued to seek “to 
hold Twitter liable for allowing ISIS to use its network to spread propaganda and 
objectionable, destructive content,” the court again held that Section 230 barred 
their claims.  Id.  And the court again concluded that Plaintiffs had “not adequately 
alleged causation” and so had again failed to state a claim under the ATA.  AER21.   
The court began by addressing Plaintiffs’ account-provision theory, once 
again finding it fraught with defects.   
First, the court explained, “providing accounts to ISIS” is just as much 
“publishing activity” and is no more “content-neutral” than “monitoring, 
reviewing, and editing content.”  AER15-16.  “Twitter could not possibly identify 
ISIS members,” the court observed, “without analyzing some speech, idea or 
content expressed by the would-be account holder.”  AER16.  And “specifically 
prohibit[ing] ISIS members and affiliates from acquiring accounts” would be “a 
policy that necessarily targets the content, ideas, and affiliations of particular 
account holders.”  Id.  Moreover, “even if a user never posts a tweet, ‘a user who 
opens an account necessarily puts content online,’” by “display[ing] a public user 
name such as @ISIS_Media_Hub, and a user photograph, such as a bearded man’s 
face” that “expresses a number of ideas.”  Id.  A theory aimed at blocking Twitter 
accounts, the court concluded, is “still based on Twitter’s alleged violation of a 
 - 14 - 
 
‘duty … derive[d] from its status or conduct as a publisher’” and therefore barred 
by Section 230.  AER17. 
Second, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent Section 230 
simply by “restructur[ing]” their complaint to segregate content-based allegations 
in a section supposedly addressing only proximate cause.  AER17-18.  The court 
refused to “ignore that the majority of the [Second Amended Complaint] still 
focuses on ISIS’s objectionable use of Twitter and Twitter’s failure to prevent ISIS 
from using the site, not its failure to prevent ISIS from obtaining accounts.”  
AER18.  And the court observed that, beyond the content-based allegations 
expressly tied to proximate cause, the Second Amended Complaint also “includes 
a number of allegations specifically faulting Twitter for failing to detect and 
prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the Twitter platform.”  
AER18 (citing ¶¶ 30, 36).  Because Plaintiffs’ claims “are inherently tied up with 
ISIS’s objectionable use of Twitter, not its mere acquisition of accounts,” the court 
held that they run afoul of Section 230.  AER19.  
Third, the court held that Plaintiffs’ account-provision allegations still failed 
to satisfy the ATA’s proximate cause requirement.  The court observed that 
“[t]here are no facts indicating that Abu Zaid’s attack was in any way impacted, 
helped by, or the result of ISIS’s presence on the social network.”  AER21.  To 
accept Plaintiffs’ “expansive proximate cause theory” would thus mean that 
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“Twitter’s liability would theoretically persist indefinitely and attach to any and all 
future ISIS attacks.”  Id.  Because “[s]uch a standard cannot be and is not the law,” 
the court ruled that this failure to adequately allege proximate cause was an 
additional ground for dismissal.  Id. 
Turning to Plaintiffs’ Direct Messaging theory, the court reaffirmed its 
earlier conclusion that Section 230 applies just as much to a service provider’s 
transmission of nonpublic messages, as to wholly public messages.  AER22-24.  
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the defamation definition of 
“publisher” should apply only to defamation claims, explaining that this Court had 
already held that Section 230 “precludes courts from treating internet service 
providers as publishers not just for purposes of defamation law … but in general.”  
AER23.  And “if the goal of [Section 230] is to promote unfettered and 
unregulated free speech on the internet, there is no reason that section 230(c)(1) 
should shield providers of private messaging services from defamation liability, 
but no other civil liability.”  Id.   
Having “confirmed with [P]laintiffs’ counsel at the hearing [on Twitter’s 
second motion to dismiss] that [Plaintiffs] did not seek further amendment,” and 
having also “concluded that further amendment would be futile,” the court 
dismissed the action with prejudice.  AER25-26.       
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 230 bars all Plaintiffs’ claims because they seek to impose liability 
on Twitter for publishing and failing to block or remove third-party content that 
allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.  Plaintiffs dispute only one element of 
Twitter’s Section 230 defense—whether their claims treat Twitter as the 
“publisher” of third-party content.  But both their attempts to negate that element 
fail.   
First, contrary to what Plaintiffs contend, providing accounts is publishing 
conduct and so Section 230 precludes liability based on Twitter’s account-
provision decisions.  The First Circuit in Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), and the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 
528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), reached exactly that conclusion when confronting 
indistinguishable account-provision arguments.  Those courts were correct.  As the 
district court explained, a decision about whom to let speak on Twitter’s platform 
is fundamentally a decision about what third-party content to publish.  AER15-17; 
SER28-32.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint makes clear that 
Plaintiffs seek to impose liability not merely because ISIS and its sympathizers 
allegedly were able to open Twitter accounts but because of how they allegedly 
used those accounts to disseminate objectionable content.  No amount of artful 
pleading can avoid the conclusion that Section 230 bars Plaintiffs’ claims. 
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Second, Plaintiffs also are wrong that Twitter’s Direct Messaging tool is 
categorically excluded from Section 230.  Section 230’s text does not distinguish 
between third-party content sent to a limited number of individuals and content 
made generally available on a provider’s platform.  To read such a distinction into 
the statutory term “publisher” would disregard that Section 230 was enacted 
against a background of defamation law—which defines the “publishing” of 
defamatory content to include communications made to only one person.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577(1); Prosser & Keaton on Torts § 113, at 797 
(5th ed. 1984). 
Plaintiffs’ claims independently fail because they have not pled facts 
sufficient to establish that they were injured “by reason of”—i.e., that their injuries 
were proximately caused by—any “act of international terrorism” committed by 
Twitter.  As the Supreme Court has made clear in interpreting the same phrase in 
other statutes, the ATA’s “by reason of” language requires Plaintiffs to plead and 
prove that Twitter’s actions “led directly” to their injuries.  Plaintiffs do not dispute 
that they cannot satisfy that standard. 
Nor can Plaintiffs satisfy even the more relaxed “substantial factor” 
causation test that they prefer.  Layers of speculation and innumerable intervening 
actors and events separate Abu Zaid’s attack from Twitter’s supposed “act of 
international terrorism”—i.e., Twitter’s alleged failure to block ISIS and its 
 - 18 - 
 
sympathizers from opening and using Twitter accounts and sending Direct 
Messages.  Accepting Plaintiffs’ unbounded theory of liability would expose every 
online platform to possible liability for terrorist violence anywhere in the world 
simply because the terrorist who committed the attack may have been loosely 
affiliated with some of the platform’s hundreds of millions of users.  The ATA 
does not permit such expansive liability. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  See Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 
(9th Cir. 2013).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   
Section 230 requires dismissal where its application “is evident from the 
face of the complaint.”  Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); see also Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1266 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss).  
Because Section 230 protects against not only “ultimate liability,” but also from 
“having to fight costly and protracted legal battles,” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1175, the immunity attaches and should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage 
of the case,” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 
255 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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Given “‘the extreme nature of the charge of terrorism,’” “‘fairness requires” 
the court in an action under the ATA to give “‘extra-careful scrutiny’” to the 
plaintiff’s allegations.  In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 
765, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT SECTION 230 REQUIRED 
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS 
A. Section 230 Broadly Immunizes Online Service Providers From 
Liability For Injuries Arising From Third-Party Content 
The broad scope of Section 230 is apparent on its face: “No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1).  As this Court has held, this provision “immunizes providers of 
interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third 
parties.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.  This immunity extends to any 
lawsuit that “treat[s]” a provider as the “publisher” of third-party content by 
seeking to impose liability for performing or failing to perform a “‘traditional 
editorial function’” such as “deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from 
publication” any content created by users of its service.  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Section 230’s broad grant of immunity serves two important purposes.  
First, because imposing civil liability on service providers for disseminating 
harmful third-party content would dramatically chill online expression, Congress 
enacted Section 230 “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of 
free speech on the Internet.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); 
accord Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099.  Second, Congress sought to eliminate 
disincentives for service providers to self-police their platforms for unlawful and 
offensive material, out of fear that such action might itself impart them with 
knowledge that could subject them to liability.  See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1163 (Congress “spare[d] interactive computer services th[e] grim choice” between 
“taking responsibility for all messages and deleting no messages at all”); see also 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099-1101; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028-1029; Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1997). 
Courts across the country have properly “treated § 230(c) immunity as quite 
robust.”  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Section 230 has been applied to a broad swath of content, including material 
alleged to be discriminatory, Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173-1174, false and 
defamatory speech, Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327, a vile and lawless advertisement 
posted by sex traffickers, Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st 
Cir. 2016), and an abhorrent and explicit incitement to violence by a terrorist 
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group, Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1356-1357.  And it has been held to bar a wide array 
of different claims and legal theories, including claims for intentional assault, 
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-1360, negligent undertaking, Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103-
1106, wrongful death, Witkoff v. Topix, LLC, 2015 WL 5297912, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 10, 2015), aiding and abetting, Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 
5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008), intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 406-407 (6th Cir. 2014), 
violation of anti-sex-trafficking laws, Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18-24, and, like 
here, provision of material support to terrorists, Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 WL 
2192621 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017).  Just as in those cases, Section 230 bars 
Plaintiffs’ claims here. 
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Circumvent Section 230 Based On Their 
Account-Provision Theory 
Section 230 mandates dismissal when (1) the defendant is a “provider … of 
an interactive computer service” (2) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as the 
“publisher or speaker” of (3) content “provided by another information content 
provider,” and not the defendant.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also Barnes, 570 F.3d 
at 1100-1101.  Plaintiffs do not dispute the first and last elements but instead limit 
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their arguments to the middle element—whether their claims treat Twitter as the 
“publisher or speaker” of third-party content.  AER13 (Second Op.).3 
The first theory Plaintiffs advance is their so-called account-provision 
theory.  According to Plaintiffs, imposing liability on a service provider for 
providing accounts to particular users does not treat the provider as a publisher of 
third-party content.  Br. 2, 15-18.  And that, they assert, is all their claims seek to 
do—hold Twitter liable for permitting persons affiliated with ISIS to sign up for 
accounts, not for allowing such persons to use those accounts to create and 
transmit harmful content.  Id. 2, 14, 19-20.  Plaintiffs contend that the myriad 
references to third-party content in the Second Amended Complaint serve only to 
demonstrate causation—which, they argue, is not enough to make their claims 
“content-based.”  Id. 19. 
Plaintiffs’ account-provision theory fails for three interrelated reasons.  
First, contrary to how Plaintiffs (inaccurately) describe their Second Amended 
Complaint, it still premises liability on third-party content, and not only in 
attempting to show causation.  Second, Twitter’s decisions about whom to let open 
                                           
3 Plaintiffs do not dispute the other two elements for good reason.  Twitter’s 
platform is a paradigmatic “interactive computer service.”  See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(2).  And Plaintiffs repeatedly state that the objectionable material that 
allegedly caused their injuries was created and posted entirely by third parties—
ISIS and its sympathizers (e.g., AER30-31, 36 ¶¶ 22, 26, 57)—which means that it 
is content “provided by another information content provider,” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
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an account are just as much protected publishing decisions as decisions to block or 
remove objectionable Tweets.  Third, Plaintiffs’ strategy of attempting to segregate 
all content-based allegations in the causation section of the Second Amended 
Complaint constitutes exactly the sort of artful pleading that Section 230 forbids.       
1. The Second Amended Complaint Purports To Hold Twitter 
Liable For Publishing Third-Party Content  
The threshold problem with Plaintiffs’ account-provision theory is that it 
does not accurately describe the Second Amended Complaint.  Contrary to how 
Plaintiffs describe that complaint, they in fact deploy allegations expressly 
invoking third-party content in two separate parts of the complaint to support two 
points:  in a section supposedly devoted to causation, see AER33-38, and in 
another section that describes steps Twitter allegedly failed to take to censor or 
block ISIS-related content, AER31-33 ¶¶ 30, 32, 35-37, 40; see also AER18.   
That latter section, for example, rebukes Twitter for allegedly “not 
proactively monitor[ing] [the] content” of “500 million tweets” sent by its users 
each day.  AER32 ¶ 36 (emphasis added).  It contends that Twitter ought to have 
searched for “terror content” by adapting a (content-based) system for tracking 
child pornography.  AER32 ¶ 37 (emphasis added).  It denounces Twitter for 
(allegedly) only recently suspending hundreds of thousands accounts “for 
promoting terrorism”—an obviously content-based criteria.  AER33 ¶ 40.  And it 
criticizes Twitter for allegedly allowing ISIS “to publicize its acts of terrorism” and 
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for allegedly failing to “censor user content,” “shut down clear incitements to 
violence by terrorists,” and “take a more proactive approach to countering terrorist 
messages and recruitment online.”  AER31-32 ¶¶ 30, 32, 35, 36 (emphases added). 
These alleged acts and omissions—which amount to allowing third-party 
content to be published or failing to block or censor it—are “traditional editorial 
functions” and therefore are “precisely the kind of activity for which Congress 
intended to grant absolution with the passage of [S]ection 230.”  Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1171-1172, 1184; see also id. at 1171-1172 (provider cannot be held 
liable for “failing to detect and remove” unlawful content); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 
1355, 1358-1359 (rejecting claims against Facebook for allegedly “refus[ing]” to 
take down “Intifada” pages that “called for Muslims to rise up and kill the Jewish 
people”).  “[R]emoving content is something publishers do, and to impose liability 
on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a 
publisher of the content it failed to remove.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103.  For this 
reason alone, Section 230 bars Plaintiffs’ claims.  
2. Decisions About Whom To Let Speak On A Provider’s 
Platform Are Publishing Decisions  
 More fundamentally, Plaintiffs are simply wrong that they can evade 
Section 230 by casting their claims as concerning only the provision of accounts—
as courts have concluded when confronting exactly this theory.  In Universal 
Communications Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., for example, the First Circuit held 
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that Section 230 barred claims allegedly based only on Lycos’s decision “not [to] 
prevent a single individual from registering under multiple screen names,” which 
allegedly “ma[de] it possible for individuals to spread misinformation more 
credibly.”  478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007).  The court explained that “Lycos’s 
decision not to reduce misinformation by changing its web site policies [regarding 
multiple accounts] was as much an editorial decision with respect to that 
misinformation as a decision not to delete a particular posting.”  Id. at 422. 
And in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., the Fifth Circuit likewise rejected a plaintiff’s 
attempt to evade Section 230 based on an account-provision theory.  528 F.3d 413 
(5th Cir. 2008).  The plaintiff in MySpace, as here, asserted that she was “not 
complaining about any of the content that was exchanged” on the provider’s 
platform, but was instead complaining only about the platform’s failure to screen 
users when opening an account—in that case, by using “age verification software” 
to block minors from opening an account or to steer them into accounts with 
settings designed to protect children.  Id. at 421.  The Fifth Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s theory, finding that her “allegations [were] merely another way of 
claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing the communications and [the 
allegations] speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online third-party-generated 
content.”  Id. at 419-420; see also Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 
156 (Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing analogous claims against MySpace, explaining 
 - 26 - 
 
that “[a]t its core, appellants want MySpace to regulate what appears on its Web 
site”); Cohen, 2017 WL 2192621, at *12 (explaining that any “attempt to draw a 
narrow distinction between policing accounts and policing content must ultimately 
be rejected”).   
These courts—like the court below—were correct to reject an account-
provision theory because imposing liability for permitting particular individuals to 
open or maintain an account would penalize a protected publishing decision: “the 
decision to permit third parties to post content.”  SER30 (First Op.).  “The broad 
construction accorded to [S]ection 230 as a whole has resulted in a capacious 
conception of what it means to treat a website operator as the publisher … of 
information provided by a third party.”  Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 19.  “[W]hat 
matters is not the name of the cause the action” or the “label[]” that a plaintiff puts 
on her “theory” but “whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to 
treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of content provided by another.”  
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-1103.  If “the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant 
violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker,” 
that is the end of the analysis, and Section 230 “precludes liability.”  Id. at 1102.   
No “intellectual gymnastics” are required to see that providing accounts is 
publishing conduct.  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  This Court has recognized 
repeatedly that publishing conduct includes “any activity that can be boiled down 
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to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online.”  
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-1171; see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  A 
decision about who may have an account is simply one of many ways a service 
provider controls what third-party content appears on its platform.  Twitter can 
restrict users from posting Tweets by denying them an account at the outset, by 
removing particular Tweets, or by shutting down accounts because of the Tweets 
they have posted.  When it comes to social media accounts, the difference between 
“handing someone a tool” and “supervising the use of that tool” (Appellant Br. 16) 
is merely a matter of “timing” and “scope,” AER16-17 (Second Op.).  As the 
district court concluded, whether blocking an account or removing a Tweet, the 
provider is deciding whether “to permit third parties to post content,” SER30, and 
is therefore engaging in “publishing activity,” AER16-17.   
The district court could hardly have concluded otherwise given this Court’s 
oft-repeated admonition that “[a] distinction between removing an item once it has 
appeared on the Internet and screening before publication cannot fly.”  Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1032; see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 n.8 (“[i]t is immaterial” whether 
the “decision comes in the form of deciding what to publish in the first place or 
what to remove among the published material”). “The scope of the immunity 
cannot turn on whether the publisher approaches the selection process as one of 
inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method or degree, not substance.”  
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Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032.  At any stage, decisions about what may be posted are 
publishing decisions, and therefore within the scope of Section 230 immunity. 
Plaintiffs are simply wrong, moreover, that barring users from signing up for 
accounts based on “status” has “nothing whatsoever” to do with the content of 
Tweets that appears on Twitter’s platform.  Br. 18.  As the district court held, there 
is nothing “content-neutral” about “specifically prohibit[ing] ISIS members and 
affiliates from acquiring accounts—a policy that necessarily targets the content, 
ideas, and affiliations of particular accountholders.”  AER16.  A “status-based” 
decision about whom to publish, in other words, is ultimately a decision about what 
to publish.   
Consider, as a hypothetical, a left-leaning newspaper’s decision to hire an 
author known for holding conservative views to write a weekly column in its 
opinion pages.  Such a decision would be a publishing decision that may have been 
motivated by, for example, the newspaper’s goal to diversify the ideological 
viewpoints it publishes.  See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47, 50 
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding that Section 230 immunized AOL for making Matt 
Drudge’s column available on its platform).  Conversely, “‘restrictions based on 
the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.’”  
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015).  A service provider’s 
“choices as to who may use its platform are inherently bound up in its decisions as 
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to what may be said on its platform.”  Cohen, 2017 WL 2192621, at *12 
(dismissing claims against Facebook for allegedly providing “material support” to 
Hamas by allegedly allowing Hamas to use Facebook services) (emphases added).  
Plaintiffs’ own pleadings illustrate the tight interplay between whom Twitter 
allows to open an account and what third-party content is published.  As the district 
court explained, the Second Amended Complaint is “riddled with detailed 
descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, and videos disseminated through 
Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of that content.”  
AER18.  These voluminous allegations about third-party content “cannot [be] 
ignore[d]” and leave no doubt that Plaintiffs’ “claims are inherently tied up with 
ISIS’s objectionable use of Twitter, not its mere acquisition of accounts.”  AER18-
19 (Second Op.).  If ISIS had opened accounts but never used them to recruit 
followers, raise funds, and spread propaganda (or used them only to share knitting 
lessons or the like), then Plaintiffs could not possibly allege, as they do, that 
“Twitter enabled ISIS to acquire the resources needed to carry out numerous 
terrorist attacks,” including the attack that killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach.  
AER28 ¶ 1.  Plainly, the “rationale behind” Plaintiffs’ claims is “that Twitter 
should not have provided accounts to ISIS because ISIS would and has used those 
accounts to post objectionable content.”  AER19 (Second Op.). 
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Like those of other social media platforms, Twitter’s policies regarding who 
may open and use an account are closely tied to its “choices about what content 
can appear on the website,” Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21, as the district court 
recognized, AER17.  Twitter has chosen to create a platform that “allows for the 
freedom of expression for hundreds of millions of people around the world,” 
AER32 ¶ 35, rather than a heavily curated site that features only a handful of select 
voices.  Undertaking the onerous task of pre-screening every user would severely 
limit Twitter’s ability to permit such a large number of voices with a wide array of 
perspectives to speak on Twitter’s platform.   
That is why Twitter presumptively allows everyone who has access to the 
Internet and who agrees to its Terms of Service (including its Rules, which ban 
content promoting terrorism) to open an account and typically only “shut[s] down” 
accounts when Twitter learns that its Rules have been violated.  AER32 ¶ 39.  
Thus, Twitter’s alleged “hands-off policy” regarding account-provision itself 
“‘reflect[s] choices about what [third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in 
what form.’”  AER17 (Second Op.) (quoting Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21).  
While Plaintiffs assert (at 19) that they “do not claim that Twitter should have built 
it[s] website differently,” it is difficult to see how Twitter could have prevented 
every potential ISIS member or sympathizer from even opening an account without 
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adopting policies and strategies that would transform the basic nature of the 
platform itself.    
Further, as the district court recognized, third-party users of Twitter’s 
services put content online even before publishing a single Tweet, simply by 
opening an account.  See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103 (equating removing profiles 
with removing content).  An online profile has content the moment a “user actively 
creates it.”  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124; see also id. at 1121 (a profile “evoke[s] 
the subject’s personality”); MySpace, 528 F.3d at 415 (“[A]n online profile … 
serves as a medium for personal expression.”).  On some platforms, user profiles 
are the only third-party content displayed publicly.  See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 
1121 (Matchmaker members can view profiles and then contact other members 
“via electronic mail sent through the Matchmaker server”).   
In Twitter’s case, as soon as an account “spring[s] … up,” AER32-33 ¶ 39, 
it displays a user name—such as “@TurMedia334,” id.—and a photograph—such 
as a “photograph of a bearded man’s face,” id.  As the district court correctly 
observed, a user name like “ISIS_Media_Hub,” AER29 ¶ 12, “on its own 
expresses a number of ideas: ‘I am affiliated with ISIS’; ‘I am a media source’; and 
‘Follow me for information and publicity about ISIS’s activities.’”  AER16 
(Second Op.).  Thus, even focusing only on what happens when an individual 
opens an account, any decision to allow or block the account necessarily “involves 
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. . . deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party 
content,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102, and so is a publishing decision protected by 
Section 230.   
Moreover, as explained above (at 23-24), the monitoring, tracking and 
suspension strategies Plaintiffs criticize Twitter for allegedly not deploying would 
necessarily have relied on user-provided content to determine whether or not any 
particular user is affiliated with ISIS.  For the first time on appeal, Plaintiffs 
characterize (at 17-18) their position as being that Twitter had a duty to deny 
accounts only to persons it knew from external sources (such as media reports or 
government communications) were named on a government watch list.  That 
characterization cannot be reconciled with Plaintiffs’ allegations faulting Twitter 
for allegedly not “proactively monitor[ing] content,” deploying a tracking system 
for “terror content,” or suspending accounts “for promoting terrorism.”  AER32-33 
¶¶ 36-37, 40; see also supra pp. 23-24.  And as the district court explained, 
Plaintiffs’ theory of harm depends on the claim that Twitter should have achieved 
“a blanket ban on pro-ISIS content.”  AER16 (emphasis added); see also AER33 
¶ 40 (portraying removal of 235,000 accounts over a few months as inadequate).  
“Twitter could not possibly [have] identif[ied] [enough] ISIS members” to achieve 
such a “blanket ban” “without analyzing some speech, idea or content expressed by 
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the would-be account holder: i.e. ‘I am associated with ISIS.’”  AER16 (Second 
Op.). 
As in Lycos and MySpace, Plaintiffs’ claims “at their core,” AER17 (Second 
Op.), seek to hold Twitter liable for publishing—and failing to prevent—third-
party communications.  Section 230 therefore bars their claims. 
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Circumvent Section 230 By Confining 
Allegations Expressly Mentioning Third-Party Content To 
The Causation Section Of Their Complaint 
While Plaintiffs concede (at 19-22) that their claims depend on harmful 
third-party content having been published on Twitter’s platform, they nonetheless 
argue (at 2, 19-20), based on their reading of this Court’s decisions in Internet 
Brands and Barnes, that their claims are not barred by Section 230 because the 
Second Amended Complaint supposedly references content only to demonstrate 
causation.  As noted earlier, that is not an accurate description of the Second 
Amended Complaint, which devotes an entire section to describing the steps 
Twitter allegedly failed to take to eliminate ISIS content from its platform.   See 
supra pp. 23-24.  Section 230, moreover, precludes exactly this sort of 
gamesmanship.  
This Court has consistently rejected efforts “to plead around [Section 230] to 
advance the same basic argument that the statute plainly bars.”  Kimzey, 836 F.3d 
at 1266.  As this Court explained in Barnes, “a plaintiff cannot sue someone for 
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publishing third-party content simply by changing the name of the theory” or by 
placing a different label on “an action that is quintessentially that of a publisher.”  
570 F.2d at 1102-1103.   Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in MySpace condemned such 
tactics as “disingenuous” and “artful pleading.”  528 F.3d at 419.   
Yet that is exactly what Plaintiffs have done in attempting to artificially 
divorce the opening of an account from how that account is used.  Plaintiffs’ 
original Complaint and First Amended Complaint both forthrightly announced 
their intent to hold Twitter liable for publishing third-party content, alleging in the 
very first paragraph that Twitter “has been instrumental to the rise of ISIS” by 
“knowingly permit[ting]” the terrorist group to use Twitter’s platform “for 
spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits.”  Dkt. 
1 at 1; SER2 ¶ 1 (emphasis added).  After the district court dismissed the First 
Amended Complaint, SER24-35, Plaintiffs then relabeled and reorganized the 
same allegations in the now-operative Second Amended Complaint, grouping 
allegations regarding Twitter’s alleged provision of accounts to ISIS under sections 
titled “Twitter Provided Accounts To ISIS” and “Twitter Provided Accounts To 
ISIS Knowingly And Recklessly,” and segregating many of the allegations that 
expressly describe the content created using those accounts under the header: 
“Twitter Proximately Caused Plaintiffs’ Injuries.”  AER29-38 (all-caps removed).  
Section 230 would be a flimsy shield if it could be so easily pierced by such 
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transparent artful pleading.  As the district court made clear: “[N]o amount of 
careful pleading can change the fact that, in substance, plaintiffs aim to hold 
Twitter liable as a publisher or speaker of ISIS’s hateful rhetoric.”  See AER8-9. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs are wrong that Internet Brands and Barnes somehow 
authorize them to avoid Section 230 by quarantining allegations referencing 
content under a proximate cause heading.  There are two basic problems with 
Plaintiffs’ strained reading of those decisions.   
First, this and other Courts have repeatedly held, both before and after 
Internet Brands and Barnes, that the “basic argument that [Section 230] plainly 
bars” is that an online provider, like Twitter, is liable for “publish[ing] user-
generated speech that was harmful to [the plaintiff],” Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1266—
an argument, in other words, that the provider caused harm to befall the plaintiff 
by publishing user-generated content.  That was the recent holding of the First 
Circuit in Backpage.com:  Section 230 bars claims where “there would be no harm 
to [plaintiffs] but for the content of the postings.”  817 F.3d at 19-20 (emphasis 
added).  It also was the holding of the Fifth Circuit in MySpace:  Parties “harmed 
by a Web site’s publication of user-generated content” cannot sue “the interactive 
computer service that enabled [the third-party user] to publish the content online.”  
528 F.3d at 419-420.  And it was the holding of the Fourth Circuit’s seminal 
decision in Zeran:  In enacting Section 230, “Congress made a policy choice … not 
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to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability 
on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious 
messages.”  129 F.3d at 330-331; see also Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (quoting 
Zeran).  Nothing in Barnes or Internet Brands suggests that this Court meant to 
contradict other Ninth Circuit precedent and deviate from this settled judicial 
consensus by permitting plaintiffs to rely heavily on third-party content so long as 
they do so only to try to satisfy a causation element of their legal claim.   
Second, as the district court correctly recognized, Plaintiffs’ argument 
misapprehends how Barnes and Internet Brands describe the Section 230 inquiry.  
SER31.  According to Barnes, what matters is “whether the duty that the plaintiff 
alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a 
‘publisher or speaker’” of third-party content.  See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  The 
dividing line, then, is between duties derived from publishing third-party content 
and duties derived from other types of conduct, such as a duty derived from 
agreeing to a contract, see Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107, or a provider’s duty to publish 
its own content, see Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (provider failed to “generate its own warning” (emphasis added)).  See 
also AER20-21 (Second Op.) (distinguishing Internet Brands and Barnes on the 
grounds that, unlike in those cases, Plaintiffs in this case “seek to hold [an online 
service provider] liable for allowing [third parties] to post . . . objectionable 
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content on its site”).  As explained above, acts and omissions that determine who 
may speak on a platform are “publishing conduct.”  See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103.  
And so, a duty derived from such conduct—such as a duty to block certain 
categories of speakers—necessarily falls on the immunity side of the line. 
Moreover, there are numerous other differences between this case and the 
two cases on which Plaintiffs rely.  The Court in Internet Brands repeatedly 
emphasized that the information allegedly triggering the duty to warn “was 
obtained by Internet Brands from an outside source, not from monitoring postings 
on the Model Mayhem Website,” and that the persons who lured and raped Doe 
“did not post on the website.”  824 F.3d at 849.  And the Court stressed that 
imposing a duty to warn on Internet Brands would not “require [it] to remove any 
user content or otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such content.”  Id. at 
851 (emphasis added).  The Court discussed “but-for” causation solely to make the 
unexceptional point that Section 230 “does not provide a general immunity” to 
platforms simply because they are in the “business” of “publishing user content.”  
Id. at 853.  Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ entire case—including their theory of 
causation—depends on harmful user-generated content and Twitter’s alleged 
publishing conduct with respect to that content.  And quite unlike the claims in 
Internet Brands, Plaintiffs’ claims here, if successful, “would significantly affect 
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Twitter’s monitoring and publication of third-party content.”  AER20 (Second 
Op.).   
Other distinctions abound with respect to Barnes.  As already explained, the 
promissory estoppel claim at issue in that case—unlike the claims here—“did not 
‘seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content, but 
rather as the counterparty to a contract, as a promisor who has breached.’”  AER19 
(Second Op.) (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107).  But even beyond that 
distinction, the promise Yahoo made in Barnes “also signifie[d] the waiver of [any 
Section 230] defense[].”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1108.  Twitter, by contrast, has done 
nothing to waive its Section 230 defenses.  For all these reasons, neither Internet 
Brands nor Barnes can rescue Plaintiffs’ claims.  
C. The Transmission Of Direct Messages Is Publishing Activity And 
Subject To Section 230 Immunity 
The district court likewise was correct to reject Plaintiffs’ other theory for 
“evad[ing] section 230(c)(1)”—the theory that Direct Messaging is categorically 
unprotected by Section 230.  AER22.  Abandoning all pretense of not seeking to 
hold Twitter liable for disseminating third-party content, Plaintiffs assert a theory 
of liability based on Twitter’s “[g]iving ISIS the capability to send and receive 
Direct Messages.”  Br. 7; see also AER15-16 (Second Op.).4  Section 230 plainly 
                                           
4 In the cosmetic reorganization of their allegations from their prior 
pleadings into the Second Amended Complaint, all allegations regarding Direct 
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forecloses this attempt to hold Twitter liable for publishing—or failing to block—
Direct Messages created and sent by its users. 
The text of Section 230(c)(1) makes no distinction between third-party 
content sent to a limited number of individuals and content made generally 
available on a provider’s platform.  And to read such a distinction into the statute’s 
use of the term “publisher,” as Plaintiffs urge (at 27-28), would wrench the statute 
from the context in which it was enacted.  As Plaintiffs acknowledge, Congress 
established Section 230’s protections “in reaction to the decision in Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995),” which held that “an internet service provider could be liable for 
defamation.”  Br. 29.  In light of this background, both the Fourth Circuit and this 
Court have recognized that “[t]he term[] ‘publisher’ [in Section 230]. . . derive[s] 
[its] legal significance from the context of defamation law.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
332; accord Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103-1104 (relying on the “reach” of defamation 
law to “confirm” the Court’s construction of Section 230).  “[T]he statute’s 
protections,” as the district court explained, must therefore “extend at least as far 
                                                                                                                                        
Messages wound up in the causation section of the Second Amended Complaint.   
See AER33-34.  Yet plaintiffs conceded both below and in their brief in this Court 
that their Direct Messaging theory depends on third-party content for more than 
merely attempting to meet the causation element of their claims.  See Br. 28, 31; 
Dkt. 52 at 7; AER22-23 (“In support of their Direct Messaging theory, plaintiffs 
abandon all pretense of a content-less basis for liability.”).  
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as the ‘treat[ment] [of] internet service providers as publishers … for purposes of 
defamation.’”  SER34 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added)).   
Contrary to what Plaintiffs contend (at 26-29), reading “publisher” in light 
of the term’s meaning in the defamation context—rather than selectively quoting 
from dictionaries—is the only way to give effect to the plain meaning of the 
statute.  “It is a ‘cardinal rule of statutory construction’ that, when Congress 
employs a term of art, ‘it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that 
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was 
taken.’”  FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291-292 (2012).  Congress has done 
exactly that here—and to import a limit on the term “publisher” from a source 
other than defamation law would in no way give effect to the statute’s plain 
meaning, as Congress understood it.     
Incorporating the term’s meaning in defamation law, “publisher” in Section 
230 includes both one-to-many and one-to-one (or one-to-a-few) communications.  
AER23-24; SER34-35.  The term “publication” in defamation law “simply means 
‘communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person 
defamed.’” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
577(1) (emphasis added)).  “There may,” in other words, “be publication to any 
third person.”  Prosser & Keaton on Torts § 113, at 798 (5th ed. 1984).  As the 
district court therefore concluded, “the private nature of Direct Messaging does not 
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remove the transmission of such messages from the scope of publishing activity 
under section 230(c)(1).”  SER34. 
To be sure, Congress did not limit Section 230 to the defamation context, see 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157; Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, and courts 
accordingly have applied the provision to bar all manner of other types of common 
law and statutory claims, see supra pp. 20-21.  Plainly, however, the term 
“publisher” also retains its original common law meaning:  Section 230 “precludes 
courts from treating internet service providers as publishers” as that term is 
understood “for purposes of defamation,” Barnes 570 F.3d at 1104—that is, as one 
who communicates to “any third person,” Prosser & Keaton on Torts § 113, at 798 
(emphasis added). 
As the district court correctly noted, where courts have considered claims 
against online service providers premised on one-to-one or one-to-a-few e-mail 
communications, they have not hesitated to reject them under Section 230.  
AER24.  For example, in Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, a California Court of 
Appeal held that Section 230 barred liability for an interactive computer service’s 
transmission of threatening emails to a single individual.  52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 
381, 390-391 (Ct. App. 2006).  And in Phan v. Pham, another California appellate 
court likewise held that Section 230 bars liability for forwarding a “defamatory e-
mail” to “at least one” recipient absent “material contribution.” 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
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791, 792, 795 (Ct. App. 2010).  Numerous other courts have applied Section 230 in 
a similar context.5  Although Plaintiffs object (at 31) that none of these cases 
explicitly addressed whether Section 230 applies to private communications, 
Plaintiffs cite not a single decision—and Twitter is aware of none—that has 
excluded private messages from Section 230’s protection.  The entirely one-sided 
weight of this authority speaks volumes.   
Lest there be any doubt, the logical consequences of Plaintiffs’ theory 
evidence its implausibility.  If Plaintiffs were right that Section 230 does not bar 
lawsuits premised on the contents of private online communications, then any 
networking website with a messaging tool—indeed, any email provider—could 
potentially be held liable for any harmful message sent through that component of 
its platform.  Google could be sued for a defamatory statement sent via Gmail, 
Facebook for a threatening note transmitted through WhatsApp, or LinkedIn for a 
discriminatory job description delivered through its messaging tool.  In today’s 
vast realm of online communication, interactive service providers potentially 
would be subject to endless lawsuits and staggering liability.  Plaintiffs’ 
                                           
5 Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Supermedia, LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 
(E.D. Va. 2012) (Section 230 bars liability for sending allegedly unlawful e-mails); 
Tanisha Sys. v. Chandra, 2015 WL 10550967, at *7 n.6, *8-9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 
2015) (same); Peters v. LifeLock Inc., 2014 WL 12544495, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 
19, 2014) (same); Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-1004 (Conn. Sup. 
Ct. 2000) (AOL immune under Section 230 for emails sent through its service). 
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construction of Section 230, in other words, would not merely chill online 
expression in contravention of Congress’s clear intent.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); 
see also supra Part I.A; infra Part I.D.  It would threaten providers of email service 
and other online-messaging tools with crippling liability. 
D. Allowing This Case To Proceed Would Give Rise To Precisely The 
Harms Section 230 Was Enacted To Prevent 
Plaintiffs’ contention (at 23) that reversing the district court’s decision 
would further the policy goals of Section 230 is completely backwards.  Plaintiffs’ 
theories of liability, if permitted to proceed, would eviscerate the law’s protections 
and engender precisely the problems Congress sought to avoid.  
Under Plaintiffs’ account-provision theory, immunity would evaporate the 
moment a service provider permitted a terrorist, or defamer, or fraudster to create 
an account, leaving service providers little choice but to exhaustively evaluate 
every would-be user before allowing him to sign up for service.  Indeed, many 
claims this and other courts have previously held to be barred by Section 230 could 
be refashioned as “account-provision” claims and, under Plaintiffs’ reasoning, 
subject providers to burdensome litigation and possible liability.  For example, 
rather than suing based on the fabricated and defamatory content of an online 
dating profile, the plaintiff in Carafano could just as easily have brought a 
negligence claim based on Matchmaker’s alleged failure to prohibit persons from 
signing up for accounts using identities other than their own.  339 F.3d 1119.  And, 
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as discussed above, the First Circuit’s decision in Lycos and the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in MySpace would have come out differently had those courts thought that 
a plaintiff could avoid Section 230 by purporting to recast his or her claims in 
terms of negligent provision of an account.   
Plaintiffs’ alternative theory—that service providers may be held liable for 
harms arising from any third-party content transmitted “privately” (Br. 6)—fares 
no better.  Because such speech is virtually impossible for a platform-provider to 
police, service providers might well choose to protect themselves from liability by 
altogether ceasing to offer private messaging applications.  Plaintiffs’ theory could 
do more than just chill private online speech, it could eliminate it altogether. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion (at 23), courts have repeatedly recognized 
that application of the material support statutes very much can “implicate [the] free 
speech concerns” that animate Section 230.  For example, although the Supreme 
Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (“HLP”) upheld 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B under the First Amendment “as applied to the particular 
activities” the plaintiffs wished to pursue, id. at 8, it did so only after applying 
strict scrutiny in light of the important speech interests at stake, id. at 27-28 
(rejecting government’s request for intermediate scrutiny because “§ 2339B 
regulates speech on the basis of its content”).  And this Court, noting these 
interests and the manner in which the Supreme Court “carefully circumscribed its 
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analysis in HLP,” has “hesit[ated] to apply that decision to facts far beyond those 
at issue in that case.”  Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. United States Dep’t of 
Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011).  Indeed, Congress issued a similar 
warning in Section 2339B itself, directing that it be carefully construed to 
safeguard “the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i). Plaintiffs would have this 
Court ignore these many admonitions. 
That Plaintiffs’ theory would impose liability only if a service provider 
knowingly allowed a terrorist to sign up for service (Appellant Br. 25) is no 
answer.  For one thing, because what a service provider knew about a particular 
account applicant is a question of fact, service providers would inevitably be 
denied the benefit of prompt dismissals of suits that Section 230 was designed to 
provide.  See supra p. 18.  For another, imposing liability based on a service 
provider’s knowledge—whether with respect to a particular user or user content—
would undermine Congress’s second key objective: eliminating disincentives for 
service providers to self-police their platforms.  See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028.  
Notice-based liability would “motivate providers to insulate themselves from 
receiving complaints” and “discourage active monitoring of Internet postings.”  
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 525 (Cal. 2006); accord Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
330; Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420.  Indeed, a rule that would expose Twitter to potential 
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liability only if it reviewed third-party content (for purposes of making removal or 
account suspension decisions) would create a serious disincentive for Twitter to 
take voluntary proactive steps to enforce its prohibition against “threats of 
violence . . . including threatening or promoting terrorism.”  AER33 ¶ 40; see also 
AER10-11.  Section 230’s broad immunity thus has played a critical role in 
enabling Twitter to suspend 235,000 accounts for promoting terrorism between 
February and August 2016 alone.  AER33 ¶ 40.   
Plaintiffs further err in suggesting (at 19) that there is a conflict here 
between the ATA and Section 230.  Even assuming that Twitter’s opening of its 
platform for free speech to virtually all comers could somehow give rise to a cause 
of action under the ATA’s civil remedy provision—and it cannot, see infra pp. 47-
60—Congress enacted Section 230 for the very purpose of barring a cause of 
action where one might otherwise lie.  Whether that cause of action is predicated 
on the common law, supra p. 7 (Congress enacted Section 230 in response to 
defamation case), a local ordinance, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (prohibiting any cause 
of action under “any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section”), or a 
federal statute establishing civil causes of action, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
1157 (dismissing in part complaint alleging violations of federal Fair Housing Act 
on Section 230 grounds); Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12 (TVPRA), Section 230 
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mandates dismissal where, as here, a lawsuit seeks to hold a service provider liable 
for harm allegedly arising from third-party content. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ON 
THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT THEIR ALLEGATIONS FAIL TO SATISFY 
THE ATA’S PROXIMATE CAUSATION ELEMENT 
The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint on 
a second ground:  it fails to plead facts plausibly establishing that Twitter 
proximately caused the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach, as required under the 
ATA’s civil remedy provision.  AER21-22; see also SER 32-33 (same).  That 
conclusion was correct as well, and should be affirmed for two independent 
reasons.   
First, to satisfy the ATA’s proximate causation requirement, a plaintiff must 
plead and prove that an act of international terrorism committed by the defendant 
“led directly” to the plaintiff’s injuries.  Plaintiffs have never even attempted to 
argue that their allegations could satisfy that standard, effectively conceding that 
they do not.  Second, while Plaintiffs press an alternative standard for proximate 
causation (at 32)—under which they need only plead and prove that Twitter’s “acts 
were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation” and that their 
injuries were “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence”—
their allegations fail even that test.  As the district court explained, “[e]ven under 
[P]laintiffs’ proposed ‘substantial factor’ test,” Plaintiffs’ causation theory is too 
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attenuated to “support a plausible inference of proximate causation between 
Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of [Mr.] Fields and [Mr.] 
Creach.”  AER21.   
A. The ATA Requires Plaintiffs To Plead Facts That Plausibly 
Establish A Direct Relationship Between An Act Of International 
Terrorism Committed By Twitter And Plaintiffs’ Injuries 
The plain text of the ATA’s civil remedy provision dictates the causation 
standard that Plaintiffs must satisfy.  That provision creates a private right of action 
for “[a]ny national of the United States injured … by reason of an act of 
international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added).  The “by reason 
of” language in § 2333(a) restricts liability “to situations where plaintiffs plausibly 
allege that defendant’s actions proximately caused their injuries.”  In re Terrorist 
Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 (“Al Rajhi”), 714 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013).   
Congress borrowed this proximate cause language from the remedies 
provisions of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15(a), and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), all of which provide that a person injured 
“by reason of” specified conduct “may sue therefor.”  Because Congress “used the 
same words” in the ATA as it used in those previously enacted statutes, this Court 
should “assume it intended them to have the same meaning.”  Holmes v. Securities 
Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).  The Supreme Court followed this 
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exact approach when it construed the “by reason of” language in RICO—assigning 
the phrase the same “meaning that courts had already given” those words in the 
previously enacted Clayton Act.  Id. at 268.  This Court must do the same when 
interpreting “by reason of” in the ATA. 
The Supreme Court has explained repeatedly that a plaintiff can satisfy this 
statutory “by reason of” standard only if she can show “some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and injurious conduct alleged.”  Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
268 (proximate cause requirement under RICO) (emphasis added); see also id. at 
269 (“directness of relationship is [a] … requirement of Clayton Act causation”).  
The “central question” in evaluating proximate cause under a statute employing the 
“by reason of” language, in other words, is “whether the alleged violation led 
directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.”  Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 
456, 461 (2006) (proximate cause requirement under RICO) (emphasis added).  A 
“theory of causation” that “stretche[s] the causal chain” linking defendant’s 
allegedly unlawful conduct to plaintiff’s injury “well beyond the first step” in that 
chain cannot satisfy this “direct relationship requirement.”  Hemi Grp., LLC v. City 
of N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2010) (same).   
The Supreme Court, moreover, has “explicitly rejected” Plaintiffs’ preferred 
formulation for proximate cause in statutes that impose a “by reason of” 
requirement.  Couch v. Cate, 379 F. App’x 560, 565-566 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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(summarizing holding of Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 12).  In Hemi Group, the Court 
construed RICO’s “by reason of” requirement to “definitively foreclose[]” liability 
for “consequences that are only foreseeable without some direct relationship” to 
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.  See Couch, 379 F. App’x at 565-566; 
see also Mattel v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1024 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(similarly describing Hemi Group’s holding). 
The Supreme Court likewise rejected a mere “foreseeability” standard for 
proximate cause under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) in its recent decision in Bank 
of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305-1306 (2017).  Although 
the FHA does not contain “by reason of” language, it creates a cause of action 
that—just like the ATA—“is akin to a ‘tort action.’”  Id. at 1305; see also Boim v. 
Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 
1010 (7th Cir. 2002) (ATA incorporates “general common law tort principles”).  
The Supreme Court explained that it has “repeatedly applied directness principles 
to statutes with ‘common-law foundations.’”  Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 
(emphasis added).  The ATA’s common-law roots thus provide yet another reason 
why the ATA must be interpreted to impose a “direct relationship” standard for 
proximate cause.  
 Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “by reason of” is also inconsistent with the 
careful limits Congress placed on secondary liability under subsection 2333(d) of 
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the ATA.  To state a claim for aiding and abetting or conspiracy under that 
provision, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the defendant aided or 
conspired with the designated foreign terrorist organization that “committed, 
planned, or authorized” the terrorist attack from which the plaintiff’s injury arose.  
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  Rather, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant 
substantially assisted or conspired with “the person who committed” that attack.  
Id.  Subsection 2333(d) thus limits claims asserted under that provision in exactly 
the way Plaintiffs resist—by requiring the plaintiff to link the defendant’s alleged 
assistance to the actual perpetrator of the terrorist attack.  While Plaintiffs did not 
sue under subsection 2333(d)—pressing instead a theory of liability under 
subsection 2333(a) that “has the character of secondary liability,” Boim v. Holy 
Land Foundation for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 691-692 (7th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc); see also infra pp. 54-55 (explaining Plaintiffs’ theory)—it is exceedingly 
unlikely that Congress intended to permit this secondary-like form of primary 
liability to sweep more broadly than the express secondary liability cause of action 
Congress created.6  
                                           
6 Section 2333(d), which provides limited causes of action for secondary 
liability (i.e., aiding and abetting and conspiracy), was added to the ATA’s civil 
remedy provision last year by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. 
L. No. 114-222 (enacted Sept. 28, 2016) (“JASTA”).  By its terms, JASTA may be 
invoked in any civil action pending on the date of enactment.  See JASTA, § 
7(1).  The Second Amended Complaint, filed before JASTA’s enactment, did not 
purport to include any claim under § 2333(d).  At the November 9, 2016 motion to 
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 Further, failing to require a “direct relationship” between defendant’s 
conduct and plaintiff’s injury would create a grave risk of proximate cause 
becoming unmoored from its foundations.  The more remote an injury, “the more 
difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to 
the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors.”  Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
269.  Allowing recovery for remote causes thus would threaten to impose liability 
on a defendant even when a plaintiff’s injury resulted from “any number of [other] 
reasons.”  Anza, 547 U.S. at 458-459.  Not only would that be unfair to the 
defendant, but it could also lead to duplicative recoveries.  See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
269.  These are exactly the problems that the “direct relationship” requirement is 
designed to avoid. 
 The out-of-circuit, lower-court decisions Plaintiffs cite (at 32-34, 39-40) 
provide no basis to disregard the Supreme Court’s teachings.  Indeed, the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Rothstein cuts the other way.  In Rothstein, the court 
emphasized that by the time the ATA was enacted, the “‘by reason of’ language 
had a well-understood meaning”—the same meaning as that identical language in 
                                                                                                                                        
dismiss hearing, the district court asked Plaintiffs whether they needed another 
amendment to perfect their appeal, including any amendment for purposes of 
asserting a claim under the new provision.  Plaintiffs acknowledged that if Section 
230 bars the claims asserted in their Second Amended Complaint, it would also bar 
any claims they might seek to assert under § 2333(d), and for that reason they 
would not seek leave to amend if the court dismissed on Section 230 grounds.  Dkt. 
61 at 3:7-10, 18:14-17. 
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RICO, the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act.  708 F.3d at 95.  And the court 
relied on that textual correspondence to reject plaintiffs’ argument that the ATA 
“permit[s] recovery on a showing of less than proximate cause, as the term is 
ordinarily used.”  Id.  As Plaintiffs note, Rothstein does quote their preferred 
“substantial factor” and “foreseeab[ility]” test.  Id. at 91-92.  But in the very next 
sentence, the opinion also quotes RICO’s “direct relationship” standard.  See id. 
(“with respect to ‘proximate causation, the central question … is whether the 
alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries’” (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 
461) (emphasis added)).  The reason is obvious:  Because the allegations in that 
case satisfied neither standard, the difference between the two formulations was 
not at issue.  Rothstein thus does not support Plaintiffs’ position.   
As for the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Boim and the smattering of district 
court decisions Plaintiffs cite (at 32-36), the standard they applied cannot be 
reconciled with the established meaning that the phrase “by reason of” had when 
the ATA was enacted.  In fact, Boim did not even quote the text of the statute in its 
discussion of causation.  Finally, Humanitarian Law Project, which Plaintiffs also 
discuss (at 34-36), construed a criminal material support statute, which, like most 
criminal laws, requires no proof of causation at all.   
Plaintiffs’ claims must therefore be dismissed unless the allegations pled in 
the Second Amended Complaint plausibly establish a “direct relationship” between 
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Plaintiffs’ injuries and the act of international terrorism Twitter allegedly 
committed.  Plaintiffs have never claimed that their allegations come close to 
satisfying that standard.7   
B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Fail Even Under Their Preferred Test For 
Causation  
The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs’ causation theory is too 
attenuated to pass muster “[e]ven under [P]laintiffs’ proposed ‘substantial factor’ 
test.” AER21.     
 To satisfy that (erroneously relaxed) test, Plaintiffs would have to plead facts 
plausibly establishing that an “act of international terrorism” committed by Twitter 
was “a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation” and that 
Plaintiffs’ injuries were “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural 
consequence” of that act.  Br. 32.  A straightforward reading of the Second 
Amended Complaint indicates that the “act of international terrorism” that caused 
the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach is the attack carried out in Jordan by Abu 
Zaid.  Twitter, however, did not commit that attack.  To overcome this seemingly 
dispositive problem, Plaintiffs advance a theory that—they argue—establishes that 
                                           
7 While there is no need to resolve the issue on this appeal, Plaintiffs are 
wrong (at 32 n.3) that the ATA’s civil remedy provision does not require but-for 
causation.  The Second Circuit in Rothstein reasoned that the provision’s “by 
reason of” language requires a showing of both but-for and proximate cause.  708 
F.3d at 95.  And the Supreme Court has likewise “observed that … ‘the phrase, “by 
reason of,” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation.’”  Burrage v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2014). 
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Twitter also committed an “act of international terrorism.”  Specifically, Plaintiffs 
contend that by broadly providing accounts and/or direct messaging services to 
hundreds of millions of people, some of whom allegedly included ISIS and its 
sympathizers, Twitter violated two federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A 
and 2339B) that prohibit the provision of “material support” to certain acts of 
terrorism or to a designated terrorist organization.  See Br. 1-2, 10, 23.  According 
to Plaintiffs, those alleged violations automatically meet the ATA’s multi-part 
definition of “international terrorism,” see id. 1-2, supposedly rendering Twitter’s 
provision of accounts and direct messaging services an “act of international 
terrorism.”   
There are many problems with Plaintiffs’ theory, some of which, although 
presented in Twitter’s successive motions to dismiss, the district court did not (and 
did not need to) reach.  See Dkt. 27 at 23-25; Dkt. 32 at 13-15; Dkt. 53 at 11-13.8  
                                           
8 Plaintiffs’ overall liability theory appears to be that providing a broadly 
available online platform that allegedly was used by some members or supporters 
of a terrorist organization violated §§ 2339A and 2339B, and that violating those 
criminal statutes in turn automatically satisfies the definition of “international 
terrorism” under § 2331(1).  But violation of a criminal law is only one of several 
independent elements in the ATA’s definition of “international terrorism.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A).  The statutory definition also requires, among other 
things, that the defendant have committed “violent” or “dangerous” acts that 
“appear[ed] to be intended” to achieve specifically defined terrorist purposes.  Id. 
§ 2331(1)(A), (B).  And Plaintiffs alleged no such act by Twitter.  In particular, 
Twitter’s decision to make its services widely available to individuals all over the 
world was certainly not “violent” or “dangerous.”  Nor could that decision possibly 
“lead an objective observer to conclude” that Twitter intended to accomplish any 
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For present purposes, what matters is how reliance on that theory frames Plaintiffs’ 
proximate cause burden.  Because Plaintiffs identify Twitter’s provision of 
accounts and Direct Messaging services as the supposed “act of international 
terrorism” allegedly committed by Twitter that allegedly injured them (e.g., Br. 
37), Plaintiffs claims can survive only if this Court agrees that there is a legally 
sufficient causal link between Abu Zaid’s attack and the alleged provision of those 
accounts and services to ISIS.    
Any such link, however, is extraordinarily attenuated.  Layer upon layer of 
speculation and innumerable intervening actors and events—each a more 
proximate cause than Twitter of Plaintiffs’ injuries—separate Twitter’s supposed 
“act of international terrorism” from Abu Zaid’s attack: 
(1) Twitter allegedly committed an “act of international terrorism” by 
allegedly failing to block ISIS and its sympathizers from opening 
Twitter accounts or using Direct Messaging.  AER28, 30, 32-34 ¶¶ 1, 
19, 36, 39, 43-45. 
(2) ISIS and its sympathizers allegedly used those accounts and Direct 
Messaging services to send messages, via Twitter’s platform, 
designed to recruit new members, raise money, and spread 
propaganda.  AER33-38 ¶¶ 42-71. 
(3) Recipients of those messages allegedly responded by joining ISIS, 
contributing funds to ISIS, or paying more attention to ISIS.  AER35 
¶¶ 47, 50-51. 
                                                                                                                                        
terrorist ends.  Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 2011 WL 1296881, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 
2011).  
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(4) Those recruits, funds, and publicity allegedly helped ISIS to grow into 
a larger terrorist organization.  AER35 ¶ 52. 
(5) All that somehow caused or enabled Abu Zaid to become part of a 
“clandestine ISIS terror cell” when he was a student at some 
unspecified time in the past.  AER41 ¶ 81. 
(6) Some amount of time after joining that cell Abu Zaid, acting alone, 
committed the attack that killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creech.  AER40-
41 ¶¶ 77-78. 
As the district court held, this alleged chain of causation is far too remote 
and tenuous to satisfy even Plaintiffs’ relaxed proximate cause test.  AER22-23.  
On multiple occasions the Second Circuit has rejected similarly attenuated efforts 
to link businesses offering widely available services to acts of terrorism—under 
both Plaintiffs’ preferred “substantial factor” and “foreseeability” test and the 
“direct relationship” test that the ATA actually imposes.  See supra p. 53 
(explaining that Rothstein referenced both tests).  In Al Rajhi, for example, the 
Second Circuit rejected allegations that “providing routine banking services to 
organizations and individuals said to be affiliated with al Qaeda … proximately 
caused the September 11, 2001 attacks or plaintiffs’ injuries.”  714 F.3d at 124.  
That court reached the same conclusion about allegations that UBS provided cash 
to a state sponsor of terrorism that would be used to cause and facilitate terrorist 
acts, Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 97, and about allegations that defendants “provided 
funding to purported charity organizations known to support terrorism that, in turn, 
provided funding to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations,” Al Rajhi, 714 F.3d 
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at 124.  Each of those alleged causation theories was deemed “too speculative 
[and] attenuated to raise a plausible inference of proximate causation.”  AER22 
n.3.  The same is true here.   
Indeed, the online services that Twitter makes generally available to the 
public are at least as far removed from terrorism as the “routine banking services” 
discussed in Al Rajhi.  While Plaintiffs claim (at 40) that this case is somehow 
different because Twitter allegedly knew it was providing accounts to ISIS, 
Plaintiffs have alleged, at most, that Twitter generally knew that some of its 
hundreds of millions of users may have been affiliated with or sympathetic to ISIS.  
Plaintiffs certainly have not identified any particular accounts that Twitter knew 
about but refused to take down.  To the contrary, they allege the opposite, 
acknowledging that Twitter repeatedly shuts down “ISIS-linked account[s]” when 
it becomes aware of them.  SER13 ¶ 69.  Al Rajhi does not permit liability to be 
imposed on Twitter simply because it may have generally known that a small and 
unspecified handful of its hundreds of millions of users were somehow connected 
to or supportive of ISIS.   
As for district court cases that Plaintiffs cite (at 33-34), all but one of them 
was decided before Al Rajhi made clear that the mere provision of routine services 
cannot establish proximate cause.  And the facts in the one case decided after Al 
Rajhi established a far closer causal nexus than is alleged here.  In that case 
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(Linde), evidence revealed that the defendant bank had wired “‘martyr’ payments 
to the immediate relatives of the Hamas suicide attackers who perpetrated four of 
the terrorist attacks at issue,” and plaintiffs were able “to trace” other “transfers for 
Hamas leaders to specific attacks.”  Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 
329 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal pending No. 16-2134 (2d Cir.).  Plaintiffs have 
alleged nothing remotely approaching that degree of connection between Abu Zaid 
and the “material support” that Twitter allegedly provided. 
Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as sufficient would have staggering 
consequences, exposing every online platform to possible liability for terrorist 
violence anywhere in the world simply because the terrorist who committed the 
attack may have been loosely affiliated with—or perhaps even just inspired by—
some of the platform’s hundreds of millions of users.  Indeed, the supposed 
“limits” that Plaintiffs identify (at 37-38)—“the importance of the material 
support” and its “temporal proximity” to an attack—actually reveal the 
unbelievable breadth of their theory, as such “limits” would do little to protect 
Twitter or scores of other on- and off-line services providers that make their 
services generally available to the public from facing potentially crippling liability 
for countless attacks that have no actual connection to those services.  Stretching 
the doctrine of proximate cause that far would be problematic in any context, but it 
would be especially troubling here, given the serious First Amendment concerns 
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that would be raised if online service providers were exposed to liability merely for 
operating a neutral forum on which some third persons had engaged in offensive or 
hateful speech.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-637 
(1994) (First Amendment protects an intermediary’s editorial judgments about 
what third-party speech to transmit).  As the district court correctly held, even 
Plaintiffs’ preferred “substantial factor” and “foreseeability” test does not permit 
such expansive liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
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/s/  Seth P. Waxman  
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47 U.S.C. § 230 
Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material 
(a) Findings 
The Congress finds the following: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer 
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens. 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information 
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
(b) Policy 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
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(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive 
material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1).1 
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service 
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an 
agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in 
a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental 
control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are 
commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material 
that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with 
access to information identifying, current providers of such protections. 
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(e) Effect on other laws 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of 
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal 
criminal statute. 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property. 
(3) State law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments 
made by such Act, or any similar State law. 
(f) Definitions 
As used in this section: 
(1) Internet 
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both 
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
(2) Interactive computer service 
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
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(3) Information content provider 
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service. 
(4) Access software provider 
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software 
(including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or 
more of the following: 
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, 
organize, reorganize, or translate content 
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18 U.S.C. § 2331  
Definitions 
As used in this chapter— 
(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that— 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or 
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction 
of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by 
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to 
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate 
or seek asylum; 
(2) the term “national of the United States” has the meaning given such term 
in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; 
(3) the term “person” means any individual or entity capable of holding a 
legal or beneficial interest in property; 
(4) the term “act of war” means any act occurring in the course of— 
(A) declared war; 
(B) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between 
two or more nations; or 
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(C) armed conflict between military forces of any origin; and 
(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2333 
Civil remedies 
(a) Action and jurisdiction.— 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business 
by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or 
heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and 
shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney's fees. 
(b) Estoppel under United States law. — 
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal 
proceeding under section 1116, 1201, 1203, or 2332 of this title or section 46314, 
46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 shall estop the defendant from denying the 
essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding 
under this section. 
(c) Estoppel under foreign law. — 
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal 
proceeding shall, to the extent that such judgment or decree may be accorded full 
faith and credit under the law of the United States, estop the defendant from 
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding under this section. 
(d) Liability. — 
(1) Definition. — 
In this subsection, the term “person” has the meaning given the term in 
section 1 of title 1. 
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(2) Liability. — 
In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of 
international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization 
that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as of the date on 
which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or 
authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by 
knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the 
person who committed such an act of international terrorism. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2339A 
Providing material support to terrorists 
(a) Offense.— 
Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the 
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or 
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation 
of section 32, 37, 81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 
1091, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 
2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, or 2442 of this title, section 236 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), section 46502 or 60123(b) of title 
49, or any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) (except for sections 2339A and 
2339B) or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from 
the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if 
the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for 
life. A violation of this section may be prosecuted in any Federal judicial district in 
which the underlying offense was committed, or in any other Federal judicial 
district as provided by law. 
(b) Definitions.—As used in this section— 
(1) the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or 
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include 
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials; 
(2) the term “training” means instruction or teaching designed to impart a 
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and 
(3) the term “expert advice or assistance” means advice or assistance derived 
from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations 
(a) Prohibited activities. — 
(1) Unlawful conduct. — 
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of 
any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To 
violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization 
is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that 
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in 
section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 
140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
1989). 
(2) Financial institutions.—Except as authorized by the Secretary, any 
financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of, or control 
over, any funds in which a foreign terrorist organization, or its agent, has an 
interest, shall— 
(A) retain possession of, or maintain control over, such funds; and 
(B) report to the Secretary the existence of such funds in accordance 
with regulations issued by the Secretary. 
(b) Civil penalty.—Any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply with 
subsection (a)(2) shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount that is the greater 
of— 
(A) $50,000 per violation; or 
(B) twice the amount of which the financial institution was required under 
subsection (a)(2) to retain possession or control. 
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(c) Injunction.— 
Whenever it appears to the Secretary or the Attorney General that any person is 
engaged in, or is about to engage in, any act that constitutes, or would constitute, a 
violation of this section, the Attorney General may initiate civil action in a district 
court of the United States to enjoin such violation. 
(d) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.— 
(1) In general.—There is jurisdiction over an offense under subsection (a) 
if— 
(A) an offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 
101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(22))) or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in 
the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20))); 
(B) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the 
United States; 
(C) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is 
brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct 
required for the offense occurs outside the United States; 
(D) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States; 
(E) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(F) an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists 
under this paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or 
conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this 
paragraph to commit an offense under subsection (a). 
(2) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.— 
There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this 
section. 
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(e) Investigations.— 
(1) In general. — 
The Attorney General shall conduct any investigation of a possible violation 
of this section, or of any license, order, or regulation issued pursuant to this 
section. 
(2) Coordination with the Department of the Treasury.—The Attorney 
General shall work in coordination with the Secretary in investigations 
relating to— 
(A) the compliance or noncompliance by a financial institution with 
the requirements of subsection (a)(2); and 
(B) civil penalty proceedings authorized under subsection (b). 
(3) Referral.— 
Any evidence of a criminal violation of this section arising in the course of 
an investigation by the Secretary or any other Federal agency shall be 
referred immediately to the Attorney General for further investigation. The 
Attorney General shall timely notify the Secretary of any action taken on 
referrals from the Secretary, and may refer investigations to the Secretary for 
remedial licensing or civil penalty action. 
(f) Classified information in civil proceedings brought by the United States.— 
(1) Discovery of classified information by defendants.— 
(A) Request by United States.—In any civil proceeding under this 
section, upon request made ex parte and in writing by the United 
States, a court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United 
States to-- 
(i) redact specified items of classified information from 
documents to be introduced into evidence or made available to 
the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; 
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(ii) substitute a summary of the information for such classified 
documents; or 
(iii) substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the 
classified information would tend to prove. 
(B) Order granting request.—If the court enters an order granting a 
request under this paragraph, the entire text of the documents to which 
the request relates shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the 
court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an 
appeal. 
(C) Denial of request.—If the court enters an order denying a request 
of the United States under this paragraph, the United States may take 
an immediate, interlocutory appeal in accordance with paragraph (5). 
For purposes of such an appeal, the entire text of the documents to 
which the request relates, together with any transcripts of arguments 
made ex parte to the court in connection therewith, shall be 
maintained under seal and delivered to the appellate court. 
(2) Introduction of classified information; precautions by court.— 
(A) Exhibits.—To prevent unnecessary or inadvertent disclosure of 
classified information in a civil proceeding brought by the United 
States under this section, the United States may petition the court ex 
parte to admit, in lieu of classified writings, recordings, or 
photographs, one or more of the following: 
(i) Copies of items from which classified information has been 
redacted. 
(ii) Stipulations admitting relevant facts that specific classified 
information would tend to prove. 
(iii) A declassified summary of the specific classified 
information. 
(B) Determination by court.—The court shall grant a request under 
this paragraph if the court finds that the redacted item, stipulation, or 
summary is sufficient to allow the defendant to prepare a defense. 
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(3) Taking of trial testimony.— 
(A) Objection.— 
During the examination of a witness in any civil proceeding brought 
by the United States under this subsection, the United States may 
object to any question or line of inquiry that may require the witness 
to disclose classified information not previously found to be 
admissible. 
(B) Action by court.—In determining whether a response is 
admissible, the court shall take precautions to guard against the 
compromise of any classified information, including— 
(i) permitting the United States to provide the court, ex parte, 
with a proffer of the witness's response to the question or line of 
inquiry; and 
(ii) requiring the defendant to provide the court with a proffer 
of the nature of the information that the defendant seeks to 
elicit. 
(C) Obligation of defendant.—In any civil proceeding under this 
section, it shall be the defendant's obligation to establish the relevance 
and materiality of any classified information sought to be introduced. 
(4) Appeal. — 
If the court enters an order denying a request of the United States under this 
subsection, the United States may take an immediate interlocutory appeal in 
accordance with paragraph (5). 
(5) Interlocutory appeal.— 
(A) Subject of appeal.—An interlocutory appeal by the United States 
shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district 
court-- 
(i) authorizing the disclosure of classified information; 
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(ii) imposing sanctions for nondisclosure of classified 
information; or 
(iii) refusing a protective order sought by the United States to 
prevent the disclosure of classified information. 
(B) Expedited consideration.— 
(i) In general.— 
An appeal taken pursuant to this paragraph, either before or 
during trial, shall be expedited by the court of appeals. 
(ii) Appeals prior to trial.—If an appeal is of an order made 
prior to trial, an appeal shall be taken not later than 14 days 
after the decision or order appealed from, and the trial shall not 
commence until the appeal is resolved. 
(iii) Appeals during trial.—If an appeal is taken during trial, 
the trial court shall adjourn the trial until the appeal is resolved, 
and the court of appeals-- 
(I) shall hear argument on such appeal not later than 4 
days after the adjournment of the trial, excluding 
intermediate weekends and holidays; 
(II) may dispense with written briefs other than the 
supporting materials previously submitted to the trial 
court; 
(III) shall render its decision not later than 4 days after 
argument on appeal, excluding intermediate weekends 
and holidays; and 
(IV) may dispense with the issuance of a written opinion 
in rendering its decision. 
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(C) Effect of ruling.— 
An interlocutory appeal and decision shall not affect the right of the 
defendant, in a subsequent appeal from a final judgment, to claim as 
error reversal by the trial court on remand of a ruling appealed from 
during trial. 
(6) Construction.— 
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the United States from seeking 
protective orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to the United 
States to protect against the disclosure of classified information, including 
the invocation of the military and State secrets privilege. 
(g) Definitions.—As used in this section— 
(1) the term “classified information” has the meaning given that term in 
section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.); 
(2) the term “financial institution” has the same meaning as in section 
5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code; 
(3) the term “funds” includes coin or currency of the United States or any 
other country, traveler's checks, personal checks, bank checks, money 
orders, stocks, bonds, debentures, drafts, letters of credit, any other 
negotiable instrument, and any electronic representation of any of the 
foregoing; 
(4) the term “material support or resources” has the same meaning given that 
term in section 2339A (including the definitions of “training” and “expert 
advice or assistance” in that section); 
(5) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Treasury; and 
(6) the term “terrorist organization” means an organization designated as a 
terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act. 
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(h) Provision of personnel.— 
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term 
“personnel” unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or 
conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals 
(who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's 
direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the 
operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the 
foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be 
considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction and 
control. 
(i) Rule of construction.— 
Nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of 
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
(j) Exception.— 
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term 
“personnel”, “training”, or “expert advice or assistance” if the provision of that 
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization was approved by 
the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Attorney General. The Secretary 
of State may not approve the provision of any material support that may be used to 
carry out terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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